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ABSTRACT
In this article, we introduce the concept of the technology frame, which is the firm’s self-image of
its technological resources, capabilities and opportunities. It is the conceptualisation by which
the firm’s top managers not only identify and understand these, but by which they assign them
worth within a wider corporate strategy.  In our analysis, we consider how the frame can
influence – and be influenced by – patterns in the firm’s technology inputs, outputs and
ultimately its operating performance.  Using the top 10 integrated oil companies active in the
upstream petroleum industry, we test the frame as a heuristic for interpreting the patterns in
R&D expenditure, patenting, publications and operating performance metrics according to
predicted effects.  The panel-data econometric evidence supports most of the predicted effects,
with the exceptions arguably affected by longer-term trends or by interesting divergences
between firm views and employee behaviours.  We conclude that there is evidence to support
our view that technology frames matter because they set the boundaries in which firms plan and
act, and they provide us with one means of conceptualising ‘routines’.
1 Introduction
Nelson & Winter (1982) challenged orthodoxy by arguing that the skill of business lay
not in optimisation, as this implied choice and full cognitive awareness, but in skilful
behaviour and the automaticity of this behaviour. As they explain, the selection of
options is not random but deeply embedded in the underlying skills that have evolved
over the life of the firm. Whilst downplaying these implied limitations to corporate
strategy, the business press recognises the variety of corporate styles in evidence and the
superiority of a few over the many. In the field of technology and innovation, Gary
Hamel (2000) refers to the different “innovation styles” of companies and the evolved
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corporate “configuration” which uniquely binds the company’s core strategy and its
strategic resources1.
Indeed, senior technology staff at companies we have interviewed talk freely of the
firm’s technology frame, philosophy, innovation culture or R&D model. Far from
simply being the latest buzzwords, we argue that this concept of a technology frame2
reflects the established company routines described by Nelson & Winter within a
broader corporate interpretative framework of how innovation occurs in their industry
or at large, and their place within that process.
Personality and automaticity
Scholars of organisational theory have long indicated the distinctiveness of firms based
on their characteristics and behaviours. Nelson & Winter (1982) crystallised these
arguments in the concept of skilful behaviour in which the firm develops over time
distinctive capabilities in its routines and approach, which are difficult to imitate or
transfer. In contrast to the orthodox view that firms maximise choice through
deliberation, they emphasise the point that firms behave according to routine as well as
to strategy.3 By considering the effects of the automaticity of skilful behaviour, Nelson
and Winter widen the focus for study of corporate strategy and performance.
Leonard (1995) also refers to the mindset of the firm which is embedded in the values
and norms of behaviour maintained. As Leonard describes, “Rather, one finds a pattern
of thought and behaviour that is observable at all levels and that gives the organization
its character” (p. 260). Elsewhere, she refers to this as the company’s ‘personality’.
Penrose (1959, p. 5), in her seminal discussion of ‘the theory of the growth of the firm’,
similarly spoke of firm-specific ‘images’ that relate closely to notions of interpretative
frameworks.
                                                
 Hamel (2000), p 78.
2
 We have referred to this concept as the “R&D Model” in Acha and von Tunzelmann (2000). However,
both elements of that term often led to a misunderstanding of the concept. We have therefore adopted the
term “frame” from Teece (2000).
3
 “We, on the other hand, emphasize the automaticity of skillful behavior and the suppression of choice
that this involves. In skillful behavior, behavioural options are selected, but they are not deliberately
chosen.” (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 94).
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These authors indicate that there is a consciousness comprised of habits and beliefs in
the firm that belies an orthodox view that there is an automatic response to signals
couched within a rational frame in which the choice to maximise is unfettered. Rather,
as Hamel suggests in his concept of innovation styles and Teece in his reference to
‘frames’, the firm’s strategy, capabilities and resources arise and progress within such a
framework with which the firm interprets its world and its position within that world.
However many studies that appear compatible with this approach either exclude
technology as a strategic issue, or at the other extreme focus on it practically to
exclusion. We see it instead as part of production activity at large (von Tunzelmann,
1995), though here we focus on it rather more exclusively.
The eye of the beholder
³$OO WKH FKRLU RI KHDYHQ DQG IXUQLWXUH RI HDUWK ± LQ D ZRUG DOO WKRVH ERGLHV ZKLFK FRPSRVH
WKH PLJKW\ IUDPH RI WKH ZRUOG ± KDYH QRW DQ\ VXEVLVWHQFH ZLWKRXW D PLQG´
Frames matter because they set the boundaries in which firms will plan and act. The
capabilities and resources that result then affect the frame in a co-evolutionary
relationship. The frame in turn helps couch the more specific co-evolution between
services (capabilities) and resources, of which Penrose (1959) spoke. Because of this
interconnectivity, any study of capabilities and resources must address the frame within
which they are embedded, and vice versa.
This argument holds in the case of technology capabilities developed in the firm. The
concept of the technology frame both reflects and affects the established company
routines described by Nelson & Winter and knowledge bases within a broader corporate
interpretative framework of how innovation occurs in their industry, the role of
technology in that process, the wider innovation system and the firm’s place within that.
As such, we argue that the technology frame is a strategic capability. Moreover, just as
Chandler demonstrated the strategic importance of organisational capabilities (and we
would add, frames) of the triptych of manufacturing, marketing and management, it can
be demonstrated that together the technology frame and the embedded technological
capabilities and resources are a fourth organisational capability. In rather parallel
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fashion, we have argued that Penrose did not pay great attention to such issues because
she was essentially describing the large firm under fairly stable technological
conditions, such as largely held good at the time she was preparing her main studies
(von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2001).
Structure of the paper
We set our arguments out in the following way. We begin with a fuller presentation of
the concept of technology frames and their relevance to organisational and evolutionary
theory and industrial dynamics. We then consider how this concept provides an
extension to the Chandlerian framework. The fourth section establishes the relationship
between the technology frame and technological capabilities and resources. Using the
case of the upstream petroleum industry, we then analyse the role of the technology
frame as a strategic capability. Finally, we present a platform for further development of
this conceptual study and its generalisability to other industries.
2. The Technology Frame
In the Wellsprings of Knowledge, Leonard argues that, in order to manage knowledge
assets, firms need not just to identify them but also to understand them in depth.5 We
would add to this assertion that firms also need also to be able to assign worth to these
assets correctly. This obviously also affects therefore the management strategies for
encouraging the growth and development of these assets. The technology frame
determines how firms assign worth to knowledge and technology assets with respect to
the firm’s past and future development and performance. The frame governs how the
firm’s managerial leadership construes the dynamics of its industry and the wider
economy, its place and potential within that industry, and the role of technology in
determining these issues. On the basis of this conceptualisation of the world – this
‘composition of the mighty frame of the world’ – the firm’s top managers not only
identify and understand technological capabilities, but they assign them worth within a
wider corporate strategy.
                                                                                                                                              
4
 George Berkeley (1710) A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, pt I, sect. 6.
5
 Leonard (1995), p. xii.
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“Like an individual, a corporation has a certain style, a unique way of looking at
things that mirrors its past and points to its future by indicating ways in which
the company will carry out its strategies in the pursuit of its long-term
objectives.” 6
The technology frame is the firm’s self-image of its technological resources, capabilities
and opportunities. By ‘self-image’, we draw on the concept developed by Boulding
(1956) and used by Penrose to describe the mindset of the entrepreneur.7 The concept of
‘frame’ is best considered as the perspective from or a lens through which the firm
considers its commercial past, present and future. The frame comprises the firm’s
appraisal of the competitive value of technology, its own position vis-à-vis its
competitors, and its ability to obtain/contain these resources and capabilities.
Because firms have unique and historically developed resources and capabilities, the
technology frame is likely to be also idiosyncratic and evolving. The role of the
individual, particularly at the top levels of management, is critical in the shaping of the
technology frame and its resulting strategies. However, as Penrose argues, there is a
complex interaction between the development of resources, capabilities and managerial
function and strategy (here the technology frame). Historical resources and capabilities
will have shaped the technology frame, but this does not limit the potential for the frame
to change according to new managerial emphasis and the strategy for the use and
development of capabilities and resources to alter accordingly. The causality runs in
both directions.
The technology frame is not static and fixed, but evolving and able to be influenced.
Like our own self-images, the technology frame of the firm is not founded only in
reality (the facts and evidence of the marketplace) but also in the perceptions,
aspirations and/or pessimism of the management. However, this is not to say that
commonalities do not emerge across companies over time, trials and observations. As
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) note with respect to dynamic capabilities, “These
commonalities arise because there are more and less effective ways of dealing with the
specific organizational, interpersonal, and technical challenges that must be addressed
by a given capability.”8 This comment could equally apply to sets of technological
                                                
6
 Atlantic Richfield Corporation, Annual Report, 1982, p. 4.
7
 Penrose (1959), p. 5.
8
 Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), p. 1108.
Acha and von Tunzelmann Technology Frames 6
capabilities and the technology frames that guide their development. Our fieldwork
indicated that companies study the technology frames of their competitors and respond
to those different perspectives by adopting what seems to work or by taking an opposing
strategy.
The concept of the technology frame was first raised in an interview with the General
Manager of Strategic Research for Chevron9, who used it to discuss the distinctive
company objectives, organisation and conduct of research and development at a given
time. He recognised that the technology frame for Chevron had changed significantly
over the past decade, resulting in a shift to more and newer forms of collaborative R&D
as well as innovations in the internal organisation of technological capabilities.10
Furthermore, it was clear to this Chevron manager that there were significant
differences in the models pursued by the peer group companies. This view has been
echoed in other fieldwork and in the industry literature. In a speech in 1998 by the
managing director responsible for global Exploration & Production and Downstream
Gas & Power businesses for Royal Dutch/Shell, it was argued that technological
development, which Shell recognised to be central to upstream strategic success,
includes both utilisation and innovation; however, he emphasised that some competitors
emphasise only utilisation of technologies whereas Shell believes that both are vital11.
Certainly, we anticipate that this difference in the role of technology within the firm’s
technology frame would shape the objectives and conduct of research and development
and the development of technological capabilities.
3. Building on the Chandlerian Framework
As Chandler describes in Scale and Scope, the evolution of business enterprise was a
response to the demands for massive capital investment and the successful management
of increasing complexities arising in operations and strategy that were engendered by
the second industrial revolution. Chandler argues that the successful firms were those
who first and best harnessed the right organisational capabilities in management,
                                                
9
 Telephone interview with Robert Heming.
10
 Detailed case studies of some of the ten companies are being conducted as part of the wider study of the
role of technological capabilities in determining upstream performance, on which the present paper is
based.
11
 Watts (1998).
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marketing and production to meet the business environment. Whilst this analysis of the
two-thirds of the 20th century convincingly explains the evolution of business enterprise
during that period, it only hints at future directions for evolution of business
organisational structure and capabilities. The lynchpins of complexity, co-ordination
and risk (implicit in massive capital investment) certainly altered dramatically during
that period from previous centuries of socio-economic development. It could also be
argued that the final quarter of the 20th century saw a renewed change in complexity,
co-ordination and risk, as new industries and business structures emerged and the
market landscape shifted.
Determined by the underlying economies of scale, scope and transaction costs, these
firms organised functional activities and the managerial staff to supervise, co-ordinate
and plan strategically for them, Chandler explains. Within this structure, Chandler
identified the development of a smaller, internal research and development department
to serve the needs of production, once production and marketing organisations were
well in place.12. However, his discussion of the developing role of the R&D department
does not extend much beyond this. R&D is described as a support activity to production
that is strategically important at times, but there is no clear indication of if and how
R&D would become a fourth string to the corporate strategic bow.
Building on Chandler’s framework, we believe that as the R&D function has grown and
developed in risk and complexity, the corresponding managerial function within the
enterprise and its strategic importance have evolved to become an organisational
capability like those described by Chandler, but separate. Like Nelson & Winter13 and
Chandler, we refer here primarily to firms that are “large and complex”, although
complexity is most likely the true distinguishing feature. A cursory review of annual
reports and the business press reveal the details of senior executives with titles such as
Chief Technology Officer and Senior Vice President, Technology, as well as
descriptions of the firm’s technology strategy and portfolio. In these details, there is a de
facto description of this evolved organisational capability, which we have termed the
technology frame.
                                                
12
 Chandler (1990), p. 32
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In other work we have shown how this behaviour can be linked to meso-level and
macro-level indicators of the growing importance of technology to firms both large and
small, in the period since Chandler and Penrose were conducting most of their research
(von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2001). The proliferation of interest in ‘knowledge
management’ in organizations in recent years, despite the buzzword connotations of the
term, to us also indicates real phenomena taking place. Our macro data show how there
has been a fall in tangible capital formation in OECD countries offset by a rise in
intangible capital formation since the early 1970s.
4. Capabilities, routines and frames
However, the technology frame comprises much more than senior executive
representation and influence on high-level corporate strategy, or even a larger
commitment to technological resources. As in the case of production, marketing and
management, the resources (staff and skills) and capabilities (dynamic processes) for
R&D are part of the corporate body of the firm. The processes, the staff and the skills
related to technology, better described as the routines – the “organisational repetitive
pattern of activity” first described by Nelson and Winter14 – both embody and shape the
firm’s technology frame. In this sense, the technology frame provides the conceptual
bridge between the Chandlerian framework and the well-known theoretical
contributions of Nelson and Winter on the evolutionary nature and dynamics of routines
and innovation in firms15.
The work by Nelson and Winter has been taken forward by many authors, including –
and corresponding to the concept of the technology frame – the contributions by
Leonard (1995) and Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997). Teece et al. (1997) argue that the
strategic dimensions of the firm are in its managerial and organisational processes
(capabilities), its present position (resources) and the paths available to it, where paths
are the strategic alternatives available and the attractiveness of future opportunities. In
the realm of technological change, the technology frame embodies these strategic
                                                                                                                                              
13
 Nelson & Winter (1982), p. 97
14
 ibid.
15
 Nelson noted that, with hindsight, a greater familiarity with Chandlerian arguments would have greatly
benefited the development of An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). See Nelson (1991),
p. 67.
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dimensions and their comprising routines, which have evolved within the firm over time
and which condition the paths to future development. This is also indicated by Nelson
(1991), who defines the firm by three key features - its strategy, its structure and its core
capabilities. “Strategy and structure call forth and mold organizational capabilities, but
what an organization can do well has something of a life of its own.”16
Leonard (1995) defines strategic technological capabilities as “… organic systems of
interdependent dimensions that are created over time and can be sustained over time.
They are not easily imitated, transferred, or redirected on short notice. And as bodies of
knowledge, core capabilities cannot be managed in the same way as are the tangible
assets of the firm.”17 This implies that the organisational capability for managing and
applying technology and knowledge assets comprises a different set of skills and not
simply an extension of the skills and routines established under marketing, production
and management. Both Leonard (1995) and Penrose (1959) indicate that the
management of these capabilities requires effort at all levels to select correct knowledge
sources, to understand how knowledge is developed, acquired and applied, and actively
to change these flows according to strategy.
Leonard (1995) identifies four interdependent dimensions of corporate strategic
capabilities: employee knowledge and skill, physical technical systems, managerial
systems and values and norms.18 Whilst other authors, including Leonard, have explored
the effects of routines, skills and infrastructure at length, she draws much needed
attention to the values and norms of the firm and their role in determining corporate
competitiveness. “Skills and knowledge, both embodied in people and embedded in
physical systems as well as managerial systems all exhibit a particular character
depending on what is valued in the company.” (Leonard, p. 24)
The technology frame incorporates the ‘little v’ values described by Leonard as those
norms of behaviour concerned with the choice of technology, and this reflects the
interdependency of the frame with the technological capabilities of the firm. For
example, an exploration company that gained prominence through offshore activity
                                                
16
 Nelson (1991), p. 68.
17
 Leonard (1995), p xi.
18
 Leonard (1995), p. 23
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develops preferences for the suite of technologies developed and applied extensively
through that experience. She describes the manner by which these preferences,
embedded in many routines company-wide, serve to reinforce the core technological
capabilities. But there is another factor by which established practice (the little vs) is
challenged (or not) for its assigned worth in present and anticipated market conditions.
This factor is the strategic element of the technology frame, and it is this that provides
the link from where the firm has been (reflected in its existing resources, capabilities
and personality) to where the firm is going.
5. The role of the technology frame
Evidence of the frame
Ultimately, the relationship between technological strength (comprised of capabilities
and resources) and operational performance is at the heart of corporate strategy,
together with the corresponding relationships between the three Chandlerian
organisational capabilities: management, marketing and production. As Helfat (2000)
summarised recently, a better understanding of the reasons for firm success and failure
will allow a better understanding of the relationship between capabilities and
competitive advantage.19 We argue that the technology frame provides a heuristic by
which to explore this relationship more effectively. This view is in accordance with the
arguments of Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) on the empirical assessment of dynamic
capabilities and routines.20
Our earlier study21 addressed the role of the technology frame as a heuristic to explore
the relationship between capabilities and competitive advantage with respect to the
upstream petroleum industry, and we concluded there that measuring technological
strength through traditional innovation metrics was unhelpful and potentially
misleading. Instead of appraising the innovation metrics and drawing conclusions about
the company’s technological strength, our analysis suggested that a more dedicated
                                                
 Helfat (2000), p. 955.

“In contrast, by defining dynamic capabilities in terms of their functional relationship to resource
manipulation, their value is defined independent of firm performance.” Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), p.
1108.
 Acha and von Tunzelmann, 2000.
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analysis of the technology frame – and thus the technology strategy – of the firm
provided the means to interpret the resulting innovation metrics accordingly. In some
cases, analysts should be aware that these innovation metrics are not capable of
effectively measuring technological strength. In all cases, analysts should also recall
that technological strength is comprised of both resources and capabilities. Input
measures, like R&D funding, and output measures, like patents and publications, are
really only imperfectly capturing the firm’s available resources. These orthodox metrics
have to be placed in the context of how the firm appraises the competitive value of
technology, how it stands relative its competitors, and how far it is able to
obtain/contain these resources; in other words, its technology frame.
Frame effects
Because the technology frame is interdependent with resources and capabilities, we
expect the frame to influence – and be influenced by – patterns in the firm’s technology
inputs, outputs and ultimately its operating performance. As a matter of direct
correlation, we would expect the effects on these to be declining in strength in the order
given because of the effects of other factors, such as the interests of individuals and
changes in the market environment. For this study, we consider the effects on
technology inputs and outputs and operating performance separately.
Reflecting the organisation itself, the technology frame has some elements that are firm-
specific. However, it is possible to identify some common elements that shape it over
time. For the upstream petroleum sector, three elements of the technology frame are
likely to affect the correlation between the innovation metrics themselves as well as the
correlation between the underlying technological capabilities and the operational
performance. These elements are the upstream strategy, the nature of the role of
technology, and the role of formal appropriation of technology.
The upstream strategy defines the nature of exploration and production of
hydrocarbons to be undertaken by the company. We can summarise the strategy as
either Growth, or Efficiency with targeted growth. A Growth strategy indicates a
relatively extensive exploration programme with a primary objective of securing more
reserves. This is a longer view strategy that is more tolerant of high-risk and high-cost
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initiatives in the effort to identify new reserves. An Efficiency strategy reflects a more
cautious longer-term approach taken under conditions of persistently low oil prices and
natural gas. The strategy is targeted towards efficient (effective and low-cost)
exploration and production methods on generally ‘high quality and low risk’
reservoirs22. It is essential to pursue some programme of growth (exploration of new
reservoirs) in order to counteract the depletion of existing reserves. Therefore, in
practice, efficiency strategies are combined with a programme of targeted growth. This
programme has typically been dedicated principally (but not exclusively) to the capture
of very large (‘elephant’) fields. It is important to emphasise that these strategies are
cyclical in nature, reflecting the market conditions and broader socio-economic trends.
Therefore, it is likely that there will be some concordance between firms with respect to
this element of the technology frame.
We summarise the predicted effects of an efficiency or growth strategy on technological
inputs, outputs and performance measures in Table 1.23 Because the growth strategy
involves an acceptance of relatively high levels of risk and investment, we include a
gearing ratio (long-term debt as a share of long-term debt plus equity) as a trend
indicator of strategy. We also include geological and geophysical costs as a
technological input measure because considerable innovation in the understanding and
characterisation of a hydrocarbon reservoir24 derives from this investment. Because
these are not completely distinct strategies (given that an efficiency regime includes
some strategy for growth), it is anticipated that the differences are likely to lie in the
changes in the rates of growth and deceleration.
R&D expenditure and the R&D intensity measure are expected to change in a similar
direction, growing or holding steady in a growth period and declining in an efficiency
period. In the short term, R&D as a share of Capital and Exploratory Expenditures
(Capex) may move in an opposite direction, as changes in other field development
                                                
22
 This practice is known as ‘prospect highgrading’.
23
 In our previous article (Acha and von Tunzelmann, 2000), we considered a wider selection of
performance measures. However, the analysis indicated that some variables were overwhelmingly
determined by variations in the oil price and that others (ratios) were affected by ambiguity in the changes
of the denominator versus the nominator. Therefore, we have used here only the variables that held some
explanatory strength.
24
 Fieldwork has confirmed that the understanding and improved characterisation of a hydrocarbon
reservoir is a strategically core capability for the oil companies.
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expenditures tend to occur more quickly than adjustments in R&D expenditure. The
predictions for technological outputs are far more ambivalent, as the correlation
between a company’s upstream strategy and its choice to publish and patent is expected
to be less direct.
In both efficiency and growth regimes, companies are always seeking to enhance
performance. Because the nature of the upstream petroleum industry at the end of the
20th Century was such that the majors needed to find reservoirs with substantial reserves
to meet economic viability in a low price environment and yet secure their position in
the long term, the drivers for performance were cost-efficiency and the securing of
major new finds. Therefore, these objectives remain the same under either regime; what
changes are the levels of tolerance to risk (higher under a growth regime and lower
under an efficiency regime). Therefore, bearing in mind that the companies are bound to
some extent in the short term by the nature of their assets, the performance measures
can be expected to reflect their risk preferences as well as their success in achieving
their goals of reducing costs and securing new reserves through the application of
technology as well as other important non-technological factors (such as negotiation
capabilities, finance and project management).
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Table 1: Predicted Outcomes – Upstream Strategy
GROWTH EFFICIENCY
RISK
Gearing –
trends
Increases Decreases
TECHNOLOGICAL INPUTS
R&D Growth in expenditure accelerates or keeps steady Growth in expenditure declines (R&D
expenditure held steady or declines)
R&D/Capex R&D may temporarily decline as a share (as
Capex increases for growth), then resumes trend or
increases
R&D share may temporarily rise (as Capex
reduced), but then decline
TECHNOLOGICAL OUTPUTS
Patents -
Number
Indeterminate; if R&D increases, may increase
emphasis on patenting; expansion provides greater
opportunities for novelty, but greater exploration
focus may limit potential to patent
Indeterminate; as production focus increases
relative (G&G down), possibly increases; as R&D
effort reduced, may be less emphasis on patenting
Publications -
Number
Possibly increases for companies seeking to
position themselves; likely to be independent of
growth
Likely to be independent of efficiency focus, as
publications not costly to company (but to
individual!)
PERFORMANCE MEASURES*
Exploratory
Well Success
Ratios
Success ratios can worsen, as companies drill more
and take more risks
Success ratios improve
Finding &
Development
Costs
Increase: R&D targeted at finding and developing
new (more) reserves
Decrease; R&D targeted to reduce costs
Reserve
additions
Additions likely to increase more rapidly Additions likely to increase less rapidly
Companies will give either an Explicit or an Implicit recognised role to technology, and
this element of the technology frame can be described as the nature of the role of
technology. The predicted effects of this element are given in Table 2. The Implicit role
of R&D and technology signifies a determination by the firm that R&D and technology
are part of the infrastructure that allows exploration and production activities to be
carried out. Typical signals of a firm pursuing an implicit role regime include the
following: R&D and technology are not identified as a strategic advantage in the E&P
business; there will be no mention of R&D and technology in the Chairman’s Letter to
Stockholders; there will be no dedicated discussion of R&D and technology in the
review of operations; there will be no representation of R&D and technology at the
executive level. Firms that maintain an implicit role of R&D and technology do not
necessarily have lesser technological capabilities, but there is an inherent bias that
technological development is conducted for a specific purpose, i.e. for the specific
needs of a given field development programme. The role is therefore one of problem-
solving, rather than opportunity-making.
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Table 2: Predicted Outcomes – Nature of the Role of Technology
EXPLICIT IMPLICIT
RISK
Hierarchical
placement
Executive representation; Self-determining
technology programme; Serving but equal
No specific executive representation; Technology
programme co-determined (determined) by asset
needs, business units; Strictly supportive role
Planning
horizon
Balance of effort includes greater share of
longer view projects (returns in 5 – 10 years),
even some ‘blue sky’
Balance of effort on short term projects (6 months
to 3 years), some medium term, no independent
long term
TECHNOLOGICAL INPUTS
R&D - trend Growth in expenditure likely to decline less in
lean periods, grow more in flush times
Growth in expenditure more likely to decline in
lean times; vulnerable expenditure
R&D/Capex Relatively higher share, as R&D prominent
within overall investment programme
Relatively lower share, In part because R&D
effort may not be classified as R&D expenditure
TECHNOLOGICAL OUTPUTS
Patents –
Number
Patents more likely; Impetus to produce
demonstrable outputs and position capabilities
Patents may be less likely; Value is in application
Publications -
Number
Publications more likely; Impetus to produce
demonstrable outputs and position capabilities,
particularly for less known companies
Publications less likely, particularly where no
company policy / incentives to publish
The Explicit role of R&D and technology is found in firms that position themselves
purposefully as a ‘technology company’. Signals that firms hold an explicit role for
technology include a list that is roughly the reverse of that for an implicit role:
technology and the strategic role of R&D will be described in the Chairman’s Letter to
Stockholders; there will be a (at least one) senior Officer with responsibility for
technology and R&D; there will be dedicated discussion of the development and
application of R&D and technology in the review of operations. These firms will
generally describe themselves as firms at the frontier of technological development of
the industry. R&D and technology are strategically important to E&P activities, but
instead of being subsumed within these activities, there is an acknowledgement that the
R&D programme and technology is both informed by these activities but sufficiently
apart to look longer term. The balance of effort will include a greater share for the
longer view (even ‘blue sky’ projects).
Companies holding a more explicit role of technology are expected to have a relatively
higher share of R&D in overall investment (Capex) as well as a higher propensity to
patent and to publish, as patents and publications are useful signals of technological
strength both within the firm and to the wider industry. Where the view is one of an
implicit role for technology, we would therefore expect to see R&D expenditures to be
lower, partially because the effort will not be allocated to an “R&D” budget but rather
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to the exploration or development costs lines. Where identifiable, it is likely that these
expenditures will correlate more closely with trends in lower exploration and production
costs. Likewise, the implicit value of technology is finally in its application, rather than
in and of itself. This would imply a more collaborative and open relationship to
collaborate in R&D with other firms and a fairly weak interest in IPR per se. Hence, we
would expect patents to be lower for such firms. Whilst we can make predictions about
the impacts on technology inputs and outputs of holding an explicit or an implicit role
for technology, we do not have a priori expectations of impacts on operating
performance. Rather, we use this analysis to explore these relationships.
The last element of the technology frame to be considered within the boundaries of our
wider study is that of formal appropriation of intellectual property. The role of formal
appropriation of technology defines whether a company seeks to obtain intellectual
property rights (IPR) for the profits to be derived from licensing and sales or for the
reasons of access and positioning. In practice, and according to industry experts,
licensing revenues are not typically commercially significant in the upstream industry,
but this strategy is in evidence amongst some oil companies. The upstream petroleum
industry is characterised by knowledge and technology spillovers, which are
unavoidable given the collaborative nature of the business and the concentrated service
company sector. New ideas from one field development are quickly transferred by
participating service company staff, by individuals and by the firms themselves. This
continuous diffusion is tolerated because many of the oil companies see the value not in
the technology itself but in knowing how best to apply it.25 Therefore, the emphasis may
not be to hold IPR to prevent access, but to ensure access by the inventing company,
particularly if the patentee is a smaller oil company.
The second strategy is to use IPR to secure access and to position the company more
favourably with the governmental bodies granting licences to hydrocarbon regions as
well as with other oil companies. The smaller companies may also find that patents help
improve their technological reputation amongst competitors and government licensing
                                                
25
 Shell would be an exception to this, and it exhibits one of the more restrictive IPR policies. Other
companies (in particular BP of late and the smaller integrated oil companies) argue that it is not the
technology that conveys strategic advantage but the knowledge about how and where to apply it. This
point of view was put forward by an Amerada Hess Senior Technology Manager at an Institute of
Petroleum conference on innovation in offshore developments in February 1998.
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bodies. These licensing authorities grant licenses to the best offers from companies that
are expected to be able to deliver in an effective, profitable and environmentally sound
manner. Larger, better-known companies with track records in dealing with
technologically difficult fields have the advantage. Therefore, smaller companies
actively seek to improve their positioning in order to gain a place in the running.
The role of formal appropriation can be expected to affect the organisation of innovative
effort, particularly of collaborative projects, and the number of patents and publications
(see Table 3). It is arguable that its IPR holdings and strategy in other business sectors,
like petrochemicals, temper the firm’s strategy for IPR in the upstream sector. In the
upstream petroleum industry (as in all others), the choice to patent or publish is a
business decision and not an automatic outcome of innovative effort. There are costs
and benefits to patenting and publishing that are derived from direct expenditures (such
as legal costs) and indirect effects (such as the opportunity to collaborate). Individual
firms make these choices based on their underlying preferences and objectives. In our
fieldwork with the oil companies, it was a widely shared opinion that the patterns of
patenting and publishing were not strategically indicative of success in the upstream
petroleum industry.
Table 3 Predicted Outcomes – Appropriation of Intellectual Property (IP)
IP PROFIT IP DEFENSIVE, POSITIONING
RISK
Peer Group
Position
Leading position in key, marketable technologies
with close followers
Generally technology follower, Leading in niche
technologies
Technology
Value Chain
Strategy
Strategy to make returns throughout chain,
including sale of technologies to third parties
(licensing revenues)
Strategy to make full use of technologies (in-
house and external) in operations
TECHNOLOGICAL INPUTS
R&D – trend R&D expenditure less vulnerable to market
conditions
Impact on R&D expenditure sensitive to need
for company positioning
R&D/Capex Relatively higher share As far as market conditions allow, increases with
need for enhanced positioning
TECHNOLOGICAL OUTPUTS
Patents –
Number
Patents more likely, Continuous levels of patenting Patents also likely, but sporadic
Publications –
Number
Publications less likely, particularly in perceived
strategic areas
Publications more likely, for positioning and for
collaborative stance
Testing the frame
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In order to assess the impact of the technology frame empirically, we have to define
identify appropriate proxies for each of the three identified elements of the frame.
Recently (Acha and von Tunzelmann, 2000), we addressed the upstream strategy
element exclusively. In this paper, we address the upstream strategy element together
with the nature of the role for technology.26
Here, we provide some illustrations of the technology frame with respect to the top 10
privately-held integrated oil companies over the period 1984 to 1997.27. This group
comprised the supermajors of the period (Royal Dutch Shell and Exxon), the medium
tier majors (Mobil, BP, Chevron, Amoco, Texaco) and the then establishing medium
tier companies (Total SA, Elf Aquitaine and Atlantic Richfield). The study is focused
solely on the upstream petroleum activities of these firms, that is to say their operations
related to the exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas worldwide.
For the upstream strategy proxies, we define a firm as following “G” (growth) or “E”
(efficiency) by assessing its changes in the gearing ratio28 and the trend in R&D
expenditure. For the nature of the role of technology, we collected details for each
company over the period of study of the executive representation of technology in the
firm (whether there was or was not) and the positioning of technology in the Annual
Report. The Annual Report acts not only as an ‘autobiography’ of the firm for that year
but also as a message for investors, staff, industry partners and clients as to the firm’s
strategic interests. Where technology was given a separate section, the firm was marked
as “Annual Report 1”. Frequently, technology would receive a subheading within the
wider section on the production areas of upstream, downstream and chemicals. In these
years, the firms were marked as “Annual Report 2”. Finally, some firms did not address
technology specifically anywhere in the report. These cases were noted as “Annual
Report 3”. Where firms included technology as part of operations or not at all in detail,
                                                
26
 The leading indicators for the appropriation element (peer group position and technology value chain
strategy) are ones that require detailed information from the companies themselves and industry
technology experts; this stage of the study will be pursued in the future.
27
 These are namely (in descending order of the 1997 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly Ranking of the top
50 Petroleum Companies) Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon, Mobil, BP, Chevron, Amoco, Texaco, Total SA,
Elf Aquitaine and Atlantic Richfield (Arco).
28
 Gearing is the total long-term debt held by a company in a given year, as a share of the combined sum
of total long-term debt and shareholders’ equity. In common parlance, this measure is described as debt to
total capitalisation. This measure only uses long-term debt (instead of short-term debt) because this is
more likely to indicate a change of risk and investment preference.
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we argue that these firms are holding an implicit role for technology. Firms that report
on technology separately in the Annual Report are considered to hold an explicit role for
technology. These proxies would then be used to test the predicted relationships to
technology inputs, outputs and operating performance.
Two R&D funding metrics are used as technology inputs: R&D expenditure and
Upstream R&D expenditure as a share of upstream capital and exploratory expenditures
(Capex). Whilst the R&D intensity figure is the most common metric for R&D
expenditure corrected for size, we also use the R&D/Capex measure as an indication of
the firm’s investment preference.29 One advantage of the R&D/Capex measure over the
R&D intensity measure is that is not affected by volatility in the world oil prices and oil
tax and royalty regimes.
Because the ten companies did not make publicly available the figures for the specific
R&D funding dedicated to their upstream activities, we have had to use their total R&D
expenditures for the R&D expenditure variable. However, upstream (exploration and
production) R&D funding data were made available for the six US companies within
the peer group by the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of
Energy30. Because of the confidential nature of this database, these firms have not been
identified nor their actual figures revealed. Instead, using the average annual shares, we
have estimated the upstream R&D share of total R&D expenditures for all 10
companies for comparison. Using correlation analysis, we compared the real upstream
R&D figures to the estimated upstream R&D figures. The correlation in all but one case
was above 0.75, and the average correlation for the group as a whole was 0.733. This
provides confidence in the estimated values. However, the one case for which the
correlation was poor is an interesting case in point. During the first half of the period,
this company was actively increasing the share of upstream R&D significantly more
than overall trend in growth in total R&D. This is an example of how technology frames
differ even amongst peer companies under very similar market circumstances.
                                                
29
 Case study research has confirmed that the oil companies themselves use the R&D/Capex measure to
benchmark their technological effort against the peer group.
30
 This study has benefited greatly from the assistance and advice of Jon Rasmussen and Neal Davis of
the Energy Information Administration.
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The technology output measures used are the upstream patents and publications of each
firm over the period of study. Patent data were obtained from the Derwent Scientific
and Patent Information database31, SubClass H01 Crude Oil and Natural Gas. This
subset of patents collates patents granted around the world, assembled to avoid double
counting, ascribed to the appropriate business, research or governmental entity32 and
coded by industrial relevance. This analysis has addressed patent counts rather than
citations as a first measure of investigation. The publication data were provided by the
TULSA database, developed and maintained by Petroleum Abstracts33 of the University
of Tulsa, which is the leading abstracting and indexing service for the upstream
petroleum industry. The database contains more than 650,000 entries dating from 1965
to the present and which have been ‘filtered’ to include only high quality and relevant
technical literature pertinent to the upstream petroleum industry.
The operating performance variables we use are finding and development costs (FDC),
additions to reserves, and exploratory well success ratios. The FDC ratio is a measure of
efficiency, in which the sum of the costs of exploration, development and unproven
property is set against additions to reserves related to these costs. Well success ratios are
the number of productive to total wells drilled (exploratory and development).
Additions to reserves are reserves added through extensions and discoveries, improved
recovery, purchases and (within company) transfers, before production and sales. Whilst
these measures are not solely indicators of technical change, they do reflect technical
change. According to recent research, improvements in technology and in technique (or
methodology) to predict subsurface geological structures directly improve well success
ratios. Likewise, Fagan (1997) has demonstrated for the US industry, technical change
is reducing average finding costs at an accelerating rate.34
                                                
31
 Derwent Scientific and Patent Information, 1725 Duke Street, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia 22314.
Dr Donald Walter and Dr Deborah Hansell conducted the analysis.
32
 In the case of a trading group, the patents of the subsidiaries are ascribed to the parent company. In the
case of conglomerates, the patents typically will be ascribed to each principal trading company within the
conglomerate.
33
 Petroleum Abstracts Service, The University of Tulsa, 600 South College Avenue-HH100, Tulsa,
Oklahoma 74104-3189. Carol Guy conducted the analysis.
34
 In her study, Fagan estimated the rate of cost diminution as reaching nearly 15% in 1994 for onshore
efforts and 17.6% for offshore. Although there are significant variations in the diminution rates, there is a
clear trend (both onshore and offshore) that accelerates from the mid-1980s. While her figures may be
more indicative of scale effects rather than a precise estimate, it can be argued that FDCs do reflect the
employment of superior technologies and techniques in that these innovations allow for a more informed
bidding for unproven acreage, operating cost reductions and prospect highgrading (which is the practice
of only going after the sure bets).
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Estimation and analysis
We structure the relationships for the technology frame proxies to be tested thus:
1 G = •  + • Gear + • R&D + • ExecRep + • Annual Rep1 + • Annual Rep2 +
• UpRDCapex + u
2 Exec Rep = •  + • UpRDCapex + u
3 Annual Rep1 = •  + • UpRDCapex + u
4 Annual Rep2 = •  + • UpRDCapex + u
5 Annual Rep3 = •  + • UpRDCapex + u
Where G = Growth, Gear = Gearing; R&D = R&D expenditure in real terms; Exec Rep = executive
representation for technology; Annual Rep1 = technology given separate section in the Annual
Report; Annual Rep 2 = technology discussed, but within an operating section; Annual Rep3 =
technology not specifically discussed; UpRDCapex = share of upstream R&D in upstream capex.
We begin by testing for expected correlates of the dichotomous variable G, the growth
(rather than efficiency) indicator of the behaviour of firm j in regard to its technology
frame. The use of random effects in the probit analysis implies that the companies
chosen for analysis are randomly chosen among all actual or potential companies. Since
our data comprise all the oil company majors for many of the variables, if not all of the
observations, this may seem unduly generous. On the other hand, statistical difficulties
confront us if we instead opt for a fixed-effects model in a probit context. “There is no
command for a conditional fixed-effects model, as there does not exist a sufficient
statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood.”35
In Table 4, Equation (1) regresses Growth (G) against variables, which include the
gearing ratio and R&D expenditures in constant prices. Since these two variables were
used to define the value of the frame variable G, it would be expected that they be
positively related to G. The variables Gear and R&D are indeed significantly positively
correlated with the dichotomous variable G at the 5% level or better. It is the
performance of other variables which is more interesting. The significant finding is for
Ann Rep1, i.e. where technology is explicit in the Annual Report, which emerges as
positively related to G. This would suggest that companies would hold a more explicit
role for technology during times of expansion. This would be consistent with the
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explanation that, in times of growth, companies look beyond problem-solving
technology efforts to more “game changing” initiatives. Overall, in this equation, the
Wald statistic is significant at above the 5% level, but the proportion of total variance
contributed by panel-level variance (rho) is virtually zero. Hence in this equation a
pooled estimate would be as justifiable as the panel-data approach; or in other words,
allowing for company differences adds almost nothing to the fit.
Table 4: Panel-data probit regressions on Technology Frame proxies
Variable Eqn (1) Eqn (2) Eqn (3) Eqn (4) Eqn (5)
Dep Var Growth Exec Rep Ann Rep1 Ann Rep2 Ann Rep3
Constant -2.570*** +1.262** -1.166*** -0.711 +0.637
Gear +0.049***
R&D +0.0024**
Exec Rep -0.0815
Ann Rep1 +0.0850**
Ann Rep2 +0.3906
UpRDCapex -9.484 +4.786 +28.88*** -11.48 -26.81***
LL -65.38 -34.68 -68.86 -44.68 -65.95
Wald 15.11** 0.10 10.35*** 1.27 8.42***
Rho .000 .786*** .177** .136* .180**
N 116 116 116 116 116
Key: Dep Var = Dependent Variable; Gear = Gearing Ratio; R&D = R&D Expenditure; UpRDCapex =
Upstream R&D relative to Capital Expenditure; LL = Log-Likelihood; Rho = Ratio of panel variance to
total variance; n = Number of observations.
Significance levels: * = 10% or better; ** = 5% or better; *** = 1% or better.
The remaining columns relate the variables proxying whether a technology frame is
implicit (Annual Rep3) or explicit (Exec Rep, Annual Rep1) to Upstream R&D relative
to Capital expenditure (Annual Rep2 is supposed a priori to be uncertain as to its
classification). In the probit equations, the signs on the RDCapex variable all turn out as
expected, though neither Exec Rep nor Annual Rep2 is significant. The strongly
positive relationship for Annual Rep1 and equally strongly negative one for Annual
Rep3 are highly supportive of our associated hypotheses. Firms with an explicit role for
technology will have higher R&D/Capex shares than firms holding an implicit role. In
all of these equations (2) to (5) the adoption of a panel-data approach is justified at some
level of significance.
                                                                                                                                              
35
 STATACorp, 417  Unconditional fixed-effects probit models can be estimated but the estimates are
biased.
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Our predicted relationships for the technology frame proxies and the technology outputs
and operating performance variables are be tested thus:
6 Patents = •  + • Growth + • R&D + • ExecRep + • Annual Rep1 + • Annual
Rep2 + • UpRDCapex + u
7 Publicns = •  + • Growth + • R&D + • ExecRep + • Annual Rep1 + • Annual
Rep2 + • UpRDCapex + u
8 F&D Costs = •  + • Growth + • R&D + • ExecRep + • Annual Rep1 +
• Annual Rep2 + • UpRDCapex + u
9 Add Res = •  + • Growth + • R&D + • ExecRep + • Annual Rep1 + • Annual
Rep2 + • UpRDCapex + u
10 Well Suc = •  + • Growth + • R&D + • ExecRep + • Annual Rep1 + • Annual
Rep2 + • UpRDCapex + u
Where Patents = all upstream patents for firm j in year i; Publicns = all upstream publications for
firm j in year i; F&D Costs = average finding and development costs for firm j in year i; Add Res =
additions to reserves for firm j in year i; Well Suc = success ratio for exploratory wells for firm j in
year i; G = Growth, Gear = Gearing; R&D = R&D expenditure in real terms; Exec Rep = executive
representation for technology; Annual Rep1 = technology given separate section in the Annual
Report; Annual Rep 2 = technology discussed, but within an operating section; UpRDCapex =
share of upstream R&D in upstream capex.
The following set of tables regresses some of the main variables of interest in
technology outputs and operating performance against similar regressors to those used
in the previous table. Growth appears as an explanatory variable, and is assumed to
summarise the effects of Gear and R&D. The estimations here are conducted in four
ways: first using a fixed-effects procedure in Table 5A, second using (GLS) random
effects in Table 5B, third using maximum-likelihood random-effects in Table 5C, and
fourth using Prais-Winsten methods to correct for autocorrelation plus
heteroscedasticity in Table 5D.
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Table 5A: Fixed-effects regressions on key variables
Variable Eqn (6) Eqn (7) Eqn (8) Eqn (9) Eqn (10)
Dep Var Patents Publicns F&D Costs Add Res Well Succ
Constant +8.716* +206.8*** +4.433*** +0.122*** +0.555***
Growth +3.876 -10.82 +1.709*** -0.0013 -0.060***
Exec Rep -0.807 +3.112 +0.731 -0.0015 +0.0045
Ann Rep1 +6.093** -28.01** +1.333* +0.0034 -0.0017
Ann Rep2 -0.808 -13.55 +0.877 +0.0079 +0.0233
UpRDCapex +346.7*** +38.95 -10.51 -0.309 -1.241*
R-sq(W) .283 .087 .162 .025 .123
R-sq(B) .027 .130 .576 .108 .242
R-sq(O) .102 .004 .229 .048 .112
F 7.98*** 1.92* 3.39*** 0.46 2.57**
Rho .687 .702 .258 .523 .427
F(panel) 22.95*** 17.68*** 3.26*** 8.21*** 7.24***
N 116 116 103 103 106
Key: See previous table. R-sq(W) = R-squared for Within effects; R-sq(B) = R-squared for Between
effects; R-sq(O) = R-squared Overall; F(panel) = F-test for significance of panel effects.
Table 5B: GLS Random-effects regressions on key variables
Variable Eqn (6) Eqn (7) Eqn (8) Eqn (9) Eqn (10)
Dep Var Patents Publicns F&D Costs Add Res Well Succ
Constant +6.933 +200.2*** +4.381*** +0.128*** +0.495***
Growth +3.296 -23.18*** +2.069*** +0.0009 -0.082***
Exec Rep +0.559 +10.02 +0.892 -0.0072 +0.056
Ann Rep1 +6.110** -26.60** +1.422** +0.0053 +0.028
Ann Rep2 -0.888 -18.67 +0.794 +0.0166 +0.064*
UpRDCapex +345.2*** +51.32 -16.76 -0.316 -1.219*
R-sq(W) .282 .137 .160 .020 .099
R-sq(B) .042 .142 .621 .239 .668
R-sq(O) .113 .016 .235 .086 .191
Wald 38.90*** 14.96** 25.06*** 4.05 18.56***
Rho .602 .675 .095 .187 .067
LM 216.2*** 122.1*** 11.40*** 35.10*** 42.63***
Hausman 3.45 22.29*** 3.54 1.61 0.00
N 116 116 103 103 106
Key: See previous table. LM= Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects; Hausman =
Hausman specification test for fixed vs. random effects.
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Table 5C: Maximum-Likelihood Random-effects regressions on key variables
Variable Eqn (6) Eqn (7) Eqn (8) Eqn (9) Eqn (10)
Dep Var Patents Publicns F&D Costs Add Res Well Succ
Constant +7.100 +192.9*** +4.345*** +0.129*** +0.544***
Growth +3.418 -12.23 +1.948*** -0.0005 -0.066***
Exec Rep +0.281 +9.518 +0.851 -0.0037 +0.019
Ann Rep1 +6.110** -26.24** +1.408** +0.0039 +0.006
Ann Rep2 -0.870 -13.70 +0.824 +0.0110 +0.034
UpRDCapex +345.5*** +81.53 -14.32 -0.316 -1.244*
LL -457.9 -617.4 -244.7 204.4 88.27
LR 35.39*** 9.04 21.49*** 3.04 14.60**
Rho .662 .667 .177 .465 .362
LR(panel) 87.47*** 67.56*** 7.68*** 29.53*** 24.10***
N 116 116 103 103 106
Key: See previous table. LL = Log-likelihood; LR = Likelihood ratio chi-sq; LR(panel) = LR test on
panel effects.
Table 5D: Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard errors regressions on key
variables
Variable Eqn (6) Eqn (7) Eqn (8) Eqn (9) Eqn (10)
Dep Var Patents Publicns F&D Costs Add Res Well Succ
Constant +4.284 +138.2*** +4.509*** +0.124*** +0.455***
Growth -3.465 -29.42** +2.401*** +0.004 -0.095***
Exec Rep +10.44** +65.34*** +0.996* -0.015 +0.086*
Ann Rep1 +3.389 -11.68 +1.442** +0.012 +0.050
Ann Rep2 -2.894 -15.50 +0.697 +0.034** +0.096**
UpRDCapex +325.1 +371.9 -24.16 -0.301 -1.228*
R-sqd .164 .144 .237 .100 .200
Wald 43.73*** 16.85*** 28.74*** 7.97 22.97***
Rho AR1 .686 .622 .524 .628 .355
N 116 116 103 103 106
Key: See previous table. Rho AR1 = rho estimated from an AR1 Prais-Winsten specification.
The last were themselves done in three ways according to the time-based assumptions –
with independent errors, AR1 errors, and panel-specific AR1 errors. Only the first of
these (which usually gave the strongest results) is reported here.
The four tables tell broadly similar stories.36 These results can be compared with the
predicted effects given in Tables 1-3. Patents and Publications were both seen as rather
indeterminately related to a Growth or Efficiency frame; there being arguments for both
a positive and a negative connection. The Growth variable turns out to be significant in
Acha and von Tunzelmann Technology Frames 26
neither, apart from the GLS random-effects model for publications where it is negative.
Returning to the source data, the number of publications is increasing throughout the
period for all ten companies, whilst the years 1984 to 1997 saw an overall change from
a growth to an efficiency regime for the group as a whole as we found previously.
Clearly, the relationship between upstream strategy and publications is tenuous at best.
Both Patents and Publications were predicted to be more likely in an Explicit rather than
an Implicit frame. In the first three tables, Patents are significantly and positively related
to Annual Rep1 (Explicit) at above the 5% level, with virtually identical coefficients
across the tables, and to Upstream RD as a share of Capex likewise at above the 1%
level (again, supporting the predicted effects). In the fourth table, using panel-corrected
standard errors (PCSE), Exec Rep (the executive representation of technology) instead
becomes the significant explanatory variable. The probable reason for which this
variable enters only when this method of estimation is used is that companies change
their Executive Representation only slowly. Hence over the period of observation most
of the included companies either do or do not have a Technology representative on the
board. If that is so, then the effects of any contribution from Exec Rep get swallowed up
in the standard fixed or random effects relating to the company as a whole. The PCSE
approach, with its standardization procedure for the errors, partially avoids this
conflation. No other included variables are significant in explaining patents.
We have found elsewhere (e.g. Acha & von Tunzelmann, 2000) that Patents and
Publications tended to be negatively correlated in terms of levels in these companies. As
described above, patents have the expected positive relationship with the main proxy for
Explicitness, i.e. Annual Rep1, but publications have a negative relationship, contrary to
our predicted effects. With their different implications, Publications are negatively
related to Annual Rep1 at the 5% level, but not to any other included variables except in
Table 5D, where there is instead a positive relationship to Exec Rep (explained as
above), offset by a negative one with Growth. The overall significance of the
Publications equations is lower than for Patents.
                                                                                                                                              
36
 In all equations, the panel effects are strongly significant. Hausman tests suggest that fixed-effects and
random-effects specifications are in most cases not significantly different (the exception is for
Publications).
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Again, the number of publications that a firm produces appears to follow an
independent trend, perhaps related to a change in the industry towards more
collaborative technological development (where IPR is heavily controlled and resisted,
but joint papers are encouraged) and to the fact that papers are essentially the activities
of individuals, not firms. Fieldwork with some of the 10 companies has confirmed that,
in most cases, papers are written outside of office hours and in addition to the
individual’s regular workload.
Finding and Development Costs (using the 3-year moving average) are positively and
strongly related to a Growth frame, as could be expected. Under a growth regime,
upstream petroleum firms are taking on more ambitious projects and are more
aggressive in finding new sources of additional reserves. Unsurprisingly, these often
result in relatively higher exploration and development costs per barrel found, and thus
the FDC trend increases. FDCs are also positively linked to Annual Rep1, with the
significance here being greater in the random-effects rather than the fixed-effects
equations. This is consistent with the earlier finding that firms in a growth regime often
hold an explicit role for technology. Likewise, we find that Exec Rep is again
significant though less strong in the PCSE equation and positively related to FDCs.
Additions to reserves are difficult to explain from these variables, and the overall fits
are poor. There is some positive relationship with the ambiguous Annual Rep2 variable
when expressed in PCSE form to allow for heteroscedasticity across the panels. In the
GLS random-effects equation, the Annual Rep2 variable also shows a slight positive
impact. Returning to the source data, we see that there was stability for all companies in
reserve additions over the 1984-1997 period, but some indications of a later rise.
Growth in reserve additions declined from 1984 to 1986 sharply, recovering in 1987 and
then continuing on a deceleration path or no growth in reserve additions until 1993.
However, since 1993, reserve additions have grown rapidly once again. The single year
recovery in 1987 is an example of how the accounting (‘booking’) methods may affect
the data, as companies sometimes manage the booking of reserves to achieve best
financial effect. The significant variation of the companies in the growth of reserve
additions is consistent throughout the period, and this probably reflects their different
stages of asset development. We conclude that it is the field cycle of assets that is the
dominant effect here; and though changes in technology frame will affect the
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development of assets in the long run, our period of analysis is insufficient here to draw
any conclusions.
Finally, Exploratory Wells Success is negatively and strongly related to Growth, and
negatively but less strongly related to Upstream RDCapex. The implication is that firms
under a growth regime and with an explicit role for technology drill more dry wells than
the efficiency firms holding an implicit role for technology. Certainly, drilling is the
most expensive element of the upstream petroleum activity; therefore, drilling dry wells
is never good and less tolerated under a drive for efficiency. This is achieved by
technology and prospect highgrading, as discussed earlier. However, this implies a
lagged relationship between investment in R&D and results in exploratory well success.
Some industry pundits have argued that the good success ratios in recent years are the
payoff of years of investment in R&D; but as this investment in R&D (R&D as a share
of Capex) declined in the 1990s (when the implicit role for technology dominated these
ten companies), it has become more uncertain whether these success ratios can be
maintained. Obviously, the continuation of the analysis of these firms into the future
will help determine the reasons for the relationship between exploratory well success
and the technology frame.
Summary and future applications for the frame
We believe that these findings provide support for our conceptualisation of the
technology frame and its interdependent relationship with resources and capabilities,
providing the mechanism by which the frame can influence – and be influenced by –
patterns in the firm’s technology inputs, outputs and ultimately its operating
performance.  We have specified three of the dimensions of the technology frame,
namely growth vs. efficiency, implicit vs. explicit, and profiting vs. positioning in
intellectual property. The panel-data econometric evidence offered on the first two
dichotomies supports most of the predicted effects, with a growth frame being
correlated with an explicit frame, and the role of technology dichotomy with upstream
R&D relative to capital expenditure. Correlations of other key variables like patents or
finding and development costs with the frame indicators are generally as expected, with
the exceptions of some of those related to some longer trends (additions to reserves) and
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to interesting divergences between firm views and employee behaviours (publications),
both of which should be explored further in subsequent research.
Overall there is a basis for arguing that the technology frame is correlated with the
patterns of technological inputs, outputs and performance measures evidenced by the
firms over this period, and therefore there is interconnectivity between the technology
frame and the resources and capabilities underlying these efforts.  By using the
technology frame as a heuristic, the patterns of patenting can be explained through the
implicit or explicit role for technology, whereas, as we have demonstrated elsewhere,
there is no simple correlation with R&D expenditures or with publications.
As stated previously, frames matter because they set the boundaries in which firms plan
and act.  As we have demonstrated in this industry example, frames affect the way the
firms decide whether to publish or patent.  More critically, the frames will affect the
operational goals and parameters that the firms establish and which guide the paths to be
taken.  They provide us with one means of conceptualising ‘routines’.
In principle, the concept of a technology frame is likely to span industries and countries,
although further research is necessary to explore this premise.  Indeed, differences and
dynamics encountered would help to elaborate the concept of a technology frame more
satisfactorily.  Likewise, firms will hold not only technology frames, but also
management, marketing and production frames.  Another valuable aspect for study
would be to compare how these frames interact and co-evolve.
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